In line with EPHA’s 2011 objective on ”Improving Pandemic Preparedness”, EPHA attended an EPP Group Hearing at the European Parliament on 9 February 2011. The hearing evaluated whether any tangible lessons have been learnt from the H1N1 influenza pandemic to facilitate better EU management and cooperation with Member States in case of future pandemic outbreaks.
Hosted by Anne Delvaux MEP (Belgium), Shadow Rapporteur for the EPP Group, the event gathered representatives of the Belgian, French, Polish and Hungarian Ministries of Health. It followed the report on the evaluation of the management of the H1N1 influenza in 2009-2010 by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).
Delvaux began the hearing by saying that cooperation between Member States – particularly concerning procurement and communication – was insufficiently managed during the H1N1 outbreak. Throughout the hearing, she deplored the lack of coherence in Member State communication strategies and said that clear rules must be established to reinstate confidence in citizens. Michele Rivasi (France, Greens/EFA), the Hearing’s Rapporteur, stated that conflicting recommendations by the agencies involved, enhanced by concerns over transparency, collaboration and independent actions had created confusion and insecurity.
Keiji Fukuda, Assistant Director-General for Health Security and Environment, WHO provided a historical overview of influenza pandemics, which were already recorded in the 12th century. The 2009-2010 pandemic had six phases (phase 6 – pandemic – was declared in June 2009), and as it moved from country to country, the gain in information allowed some governments to take more informed decisions than others. Currently H1N1 continues to be in global circulation as a seasonal influenza virus, and seasonal vaccines are used to stem it. Fukuda stressed that there is always a degree of uncertainty connected to severe outbreaks; in spite of increased WHO preparations and guidelines before 2009, H1N1 presented a number of specific challenges related to its severity, virulence and disease pattern (e.g., most cases were in young people). There was also time pressure to produce an effective first vaccine. Hence, the WHO applied the precautionary principle to ensure citizens’ safety. The lessons learnt from what some labelled ”alarmist” behaviour are that collaborations with the EU and other stakeholders have been strengthened. An ongoing external evaluation of International Health Regulations (IHR) – the legally binding framework – and H1N1 was launched in January 2010, the most thorough pandemic assessment to date which is expected to release a report for the 2011 World Health Assembly. However, certain aspects need to be improved, e.g., communications, the harmonisation of issues directly shaping public trust (e.g. vaccination strategies, antiviral treatment, public health measures), severity assessments, and timely availability and access to vaccines.
John Ryan, head of the health threats unit, DG SANCO, gave the European Commission perspective and confirmed that the specific challenges outlined above had called for the precautionary principle. The investments made in Europe served to avoid the problems encountered in countries like the Ukraine or Mexico where insufifficient preparedness spelled serious economic consquences. In the absence of a relevant legal basis & legislation, coordination efforts made by the EU and the agencies had been good. During the pandemic, the EU’s Health Security Committee met on a daily basis for several months to decide on common approaches and evaluate risk assessments. It also adopted opions on travel advice, vaccine recommendations for risk groups, and school closures. A legally binding common case definition was also adopted to allow for single reporting of cases, and joint reporting of cases to the WHO. Post-pandemic external assessments have helped identify a number of problems, such as:
– dependency on pharmaceutical manufacturers concerning the terms, purchase agreements, confidentiality clauses and transparency on pricing and availability of vaccines and antivirals;
– this had led to competition amongst Member States which is unacceptable in a union based on solidarity;
– hence, joint procurement mechanisms must be developed, and discussions are underway with experts and Member States
– available funds must be spent more wisely
– better flexibility of plans
– better coordination of national vaccination strategies
– better communication towards the public
– need to take into account 2008 Council Conclusions for cross sector approach to pandemic preparedness
Mr. Ryan said that the Commission’s 2011 work programme includes a new Health Security Initiative that will reinforce the coordination of EU risk management and address health security challenges via an ”all-hazards approach”. This would help to reinstate credibility.
Paul Flynn, Deputy, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe criticised that the (changed) WHO definition of a ”scale 6 pandemic” caused unneccessary hysteria, as exaggerrated media reports distorted public opinion, and WHO advice obliged national health services to prepare for ‘worst case scenarios’ involving a large number of deaths. Consequently, huge sums were spent on vaccines and antivirals that were never used, and there were also concerns over adverse reactions. Other health priorities were temporarily cast aside. This was all the more problematic given that the real potential impact of the pandemic was known from the Southern hemisphere and had it been assessed properly much panic could have been avoided.
Mr. I. Brydak, Polish Ministry of Health, explained how his government was able to draw on epidemiological data from other countries, which clearly showed that the disease effects associated with the outbreak were less severe than initially expected. Poland placed a lot of emphasis on mitigating panic and social unrest. Although the government had earmarked funds for a sufficient number of vaccines, manufacturers expected it to take full responsibility for any serious side effects, and the cost of the vaccine was 2-3 times higher than for seasonal flu. Hence a decision was made not to be ‘taken hostage’ by the pharmaceutical industry. In addition to unfavourable purchase and distribution conditions offered by manufacturers, the lack of solidarity amongst EU Member States, which had favoured individual over joint action, was also deplored. As a result of the H1N1 crisis, the rate of vaccinations had fallen in Europe, which was not a good development.
Didier Houssin, Director-General at the French Ministry of Health stressed that the number of young people affected stimulated the French government to exercise particular caution; deaths had to be avoided at any cost, especially since the disease pattern was unclear. In the end there had been a big mismatch of purchased and utilised quantity, however this was to ensure safety for all and continuity of economic activity. But a more coordinated, European procurement strategy would have been preferable, and ‘false experts’ should not have been given a voice. Different discourses over the potential dangers of vaccines had also prevented a joint response to H1N1.
Daniel Reynders, Representative of the Belgian Minister of Health summarised the results of the July 2010 conference organised by the Belgian Presidency and the European Commission, which addressed the need to step up effort and investment pertaining to pandemic surveillance, communication, medical measures, and multisectoral cooperation. This includes developing a trusted relationship with the media to communicate difficult issues, investigating joint procurement procedures, clarifying the roles and links between agencies (EMA, ECDC, WHO, regulatory and public health authorities), and funding independent studies on vaccines and vaccination monitoring.
Michael Watson, European Vaccine Manufacturers then outlined the lessons learnt by the pharmaceutical industry, whose role was to ”develop, produce and deliver quality vaccines”. Areas for improvement included improved communication and public engagement, better assessment of vaccine demand in crisis situations (i.e., not only related to population size but taking into account many other factors like pandemic uptake, number of doses required, etc.), expansion of research & development, and clarification of responsibility rules (e.g., liability protection and compensation schemes). He also stated that advance supply agreements could have prevented the last-minute negotiations.
On the other hand, Philippe Foucras of FORMINDEP Association of doctors and patients argued that doctors must be given a larger role in protecting patients based on reliable data. Doctors are experts who can take pertinent, confident decisions, and pandemic preparedness should not only be based on surveys and industry.
The ensuing audience discussion contrasted critical viewpoints lamenting the lack of coherence in pandemic management with a more vindicative stance taken by commentators such as Francoise Grossetête MEP (France – EPP) who defended her national government’s decision to play it safe, saying that citizens’ concerns had to be satisfied and that the situation had been very complex, which had prompted procurement based on hypotheses. Ms Rivasi concluded that more coherent, objective and efficient strategies must be deployed in the future that still leave room for national differences, and that experts needed to collaborate more, including researchers, academics, and industry.
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